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SYMPOSIUM VERFASSUNGS- UND VÖLKERRECHT IM SPANNUNGSVERHÄLTNIS
The UK’s Potential 
Withdrawal from the 
ECHR
Just a Flash in the Pan or a Real Threat?
The ruling Conservative party of Prime Minister David 
Cameron published a paper this year, called “Protecting 
Human Rights in the UK”. The party suggests to replace the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which incorporates the ECHR 
into UK law, with a “home-grown” bill of rights. The aim is to 
attribute the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) only 
an advisory role vis-à-vis the UK parliament and to weaken 
the quasi precedential effect of ECtHR case-law vis-à-vis the 
UK Supreme Court. In case this will not be accepted by the 
Council of Europe (CoE), the Conservatives propose 
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withdrawing from the Convention. This is not the first time 
that the UK is flexing its muscles vis-à-vis the European 
Convention system.
Already in 1956 the UK openly considered quitting the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) over a case 
brought by Greece against the UK for its actions under 
emergency rule in Cyprus. After the ECtHR’s decision in 
McCann v UK (1995) the UK threatened not to renew the 
optional declaration providing for the right to individual 
petition. Interestingly, the better reasons obviously spoke 
for remaining in the Convention system in the past, as the 
UK never acted upon its motions. Indeed, the Conservatives’ 
suggestions underestimate the interdependence and 
interrelatedness of domestic and international human rights 
protection. Trying to go back to a Diceyan concept of 
absolute parliamentary supremacy is not in sync with 
modern constitutional thought in the UK. Besides domestic 
repercussions, these proposals might result in negative 
consequences at the international level. Finally, the common 
responsibility of all ECHR states to preserve a peaceful 
Europe should not be discarded on the basis of an 
anticipated short-term political gain.
Interdependence and Interrelatedness of Domestic, 
European and International Human Rights Protection
Contrary to the suggestions in the Conservatives’ paper, the 
envisaged reform would in fact weaken, not strengthen the 
UK’s autonomy concerning human rights protection, since 
the domestic and international human rights regimes have 
grown into a common interlinked system. By way of 
incorporation through the HRA, the ECHR has become part 
of domestic statutory law and through the judicial 
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enforcement of ECHR rights, these rights now form part of 
UK common law. Hence, even if Parliament repealed the 
HRA, the substantive rights would continue to be part of the 
common law and it would be uncertain how the judiciary 
would deal with the repeal of such a “constitutional statute”.
Also, irrespective of the ratification of the Convention the 
UK will be indirectly held to the ECHR standards. This is 
because Convention standards serve as a point of reference 
for the common best practices of international human rights 
protection (cf. the Human Rights Council’s Special 
Rapporteur reports) and as a proof of a certain standard of 
human rights protection which is often stipulated as 
condition to enter regional or international treaty regimes 
(as e.g. the European Union (EU)).
Additionally, by forgoing the chance to make a distinctly 
British contribution to the common development of 
European human rights standards via the institutionalized 
dialogue of European judges, the UK would lose, not win 
autonomy concerning human rights protection. The current 
system gives the UK enough leeway to materialize “its own” 
standards within the European system. How well this can be 
realized is largely dependent on how effective the UK 
Supreme Court enters into a dialogue with the ECtHR. The 
“mirror-principle” pronounced in R (Ullah) v Special 
Adjudicator allows for this dialogue, providing that generally 
ECtHR’s judgments shall be followed unless there are strong 
reasons to dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case 
law (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). In fact, in 2009 the Court 
declined to follow a decision of the ECtHR Chamber in R v 
Horncastle which was directly addressed in Al-Khawaja and 
Tahery v United Kingdom and described as a sign of a 
constructive dialogue between the courts by UK judge 
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Bratza in his concurring opinion. Indeed, section 2 HRA only 
requires UK courts to “take into account” ECtHR case-law, 
which allows the deviance in special cases. Here the 
Supreme Court can insist on particular aspects of the 
domestic culture and flesh out the UK’s “constitutional red 
line” as it was done by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in Görgülü.
So long as the UK decided to work with and not against the 
Convention system, the latter reacted quite flexibly. Both, 
the structural principle of subsidiarity and the interpretive 
principle of margin of appreciation were pushed by the UK 
in the reform of the 15  protocol to alleviate the perceived 
ECtHR’s democratic deficit and to reflect that the 
Convention system is subsidiary to the safeguarding of 
human rights at the national level. This pursued the 
objective of strengthening national authorities in the system 
of European human rights protection, as they are, in 
principle, deemed to be better placed than an international 
court to evaluate local needs and conditions. Since then, 
both principles have been further refined and reinforced by 
the ECtHR in its ensuing jurisprudence, as pointed out by 
the Court’s president and Judge Spano, allowing for the 
“centre of gravity” of the Convention system to become 
lower than before the Brighton conference. Thus, the 
Conservatives’ broad brush reproach of the Court’s “mission 
creep” appears distorting. The reference to the prisoners’ 
disenfranchisement struggle in the UK’s argumentation for 
withdrawal reveals an overreaction, apparently deriving 
from a misconception of the functioning of the Convention 
system. The UK parliament’s refusal to comply with the 
ECtHR’s case-law in Greens and M.T. and Hirst (No. 2) is not 
per se a reason to leave the Convention, but demonstrates 
the workings of a vivid complementary system of human 
th
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rights protection. Only if conceived in a purely hierarchical 
manner, domestic deviance would be unthinkable. In a 
system, however, that depends on judicial dialogue and 
conceives of the Convention states as entities that are best 
suited to serve the people’s needs at the local level, blind 
obedience cannot be desired. By contrast, constructive 
contestation can render even better results in the end. It 
seems, however, that the UK Supreme Court still has to find 
its role in this cooperative system. It silently deferred the 
matter of prisoners’ disenfranchisement to parliament. 
Instead, by taking a judicial stance on the matter the UK 
Supreme Court would have helped to “embed” the highly 
contentious decisions into UK constitutional law which 
might have facilitated a more constructive ensuing political 
discussion.
Thus, if the UK uses the chances to shape the Convention 
system, it will succeed in rendering human rights protection 
in the UK more “home-grown”. Instead, if the UK repeals the 
HRA or even withdraws from the ECHR, it will thereby forfeit 
its opportunity to make a distinctly British contribution, but 
will continue to be assessed by European and international 
human rights standards.
Domestic Repercussions of HRA Repeal or ECHR 
Withdrawal
Moreover, the repeal of the HRA might have considerable 
implications for the currently stable relationship between 
the UK judiciary and parliament. By the ratification of 
protocol 11 ECHR and the introduction of the HRA the UK 
decided to adhere to a concept of democracy that integrates 
the effective protection of human rights against the 
unlimited will of parliament. In R (Jackson) v Attorney-
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General the judges pointed out that if parliament were to 
attempt to remove the courts’ powers of judicial review, the 
courts might refuse to recognize such legislation as valid. 
Lord Hope stated that the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty “is no longer, if it ever was, absolute”. Prominent 
scholars have argued for the rule of law to be recognized as 
a constitutional doctrine of equal strength to parliamentary 
sovereignty. Hence, were the well-balanced arrangement 
between parliament and the UK Supreme Court under ss. 3
(1) and 4 HRA repealed, it would not be unrealistic to see the 
UK Supreme Court proactively protecting the fundamental 
common law rights, also against parliament. Further, the 
Conservatives’ proposals might have serious implications for 
the stable relations between England and the devolved
countries, as they would have to consent to the UK’s 
withdrawal from the Convention according to the Sewel 
Convention. The repeal of the HRA would most likely 
jeopardize the unity of the UK’s human rights regime. The 
ECHR is incorporated directly into the devolution statutes 
and Scotland, Wales and Northern-Ireland will presumably 
want to continue to adhere to the Convention system, at 
least in the devolved areas of the law.
European and International Consequences of HRA Repeal 
or ECHR Withdrawal
Repercussion might also be faced at the international level. 
Obviously, the CoE could not accept that the UK would 
make the ECtHR an advisory body to the UK parliament as 
this would openly conflict with Art. 46 (1) ECHR. The same 
goes for the refusal of a binding nature of ECtHR decisions 
over UK Supreme Court decisions. The idea of withdrawing 
from the Convention to re-ratify it with the desired 
reservations would most likely be unacceptable, because this 
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behavior would merely pursue the purpose of circumventing 
existing ECHR-obligations. Most probably thus, the UK 
would denounce the Convention (Art. 58 (1) ECHR) or it 
would be expelled from its CoE membership (Arts. 8, 3 CoE 
Statute) and would consequently cease to be a party to the 
ECHR (Art. 58 (3) ECHR). Eventually, this might also lead to 
the UK’s suspension of certain EU membership rights (Art. 7 
(3) TEU). For the accession to the EU the ratification of the 
ECHR functions as a practical indicator and condition (cf. 
Arts. 49, 2 TEU and the Copenhagen criteria). Yet, ECHR 
ratification is not stipulated as a legal requirement for EU 
accession or the continued EU membership. However, ECHR 
standards are defined as general principles of European 
Union law (Art. 6 (3) TEU) and the EU member states are 
bound to comply with the values set out in Art. 2 TEU, 
amongst them the respect for human rights (cf. also the 
interview with Koen Lenaerts). Once the EU will have 
acceded to the ECHR, as envisaged by Art. 6 (2) TEU, EU 
citizens will be able to have ECHR-abidance monitored by 
the ECtHR in areas of Union law application. Overall, the 
TEU seems to be built upon the assumption that EU member 
states are also parties to the Convention so that the member 
states can be trusted to live up to the standards of Art. 2 TEU 
when acting within the scope of Union law. Hence, one 
could conceive of ECHR ratification as an implicit de jure
requirement for EU membership. If all of the Conservative 
suggestions were implemented – e.g. methodologically, 
dropping the proportionality test when balancing rights or, 
substantively, abandoning the extraterritorial application of 
human rights – the UK would fall below the Convention 
standards. Finally, this might result in the suspension of EU 
treaty rights under Arts. 7 (3), 2 TEU.
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Moreover, the Conservatives’ suggestions may have serious 
repercussions regarding the UK’s international credibility 
and respectability. If the UK quits the Court’s obligatory 
jurisdiction, the UK would be on a par with Belarus. 
Regarding the idea of a post ECtHR-judgment parliamentary 
control, the UK ranges on the same level as Russia and 
Ukraine. Furthermore, considering that the Convention 
system is the only effective European monitoring system of 
human rights protection, withdrawing from the Convention 
would imply the loss of this “high standard attestation”. So 
whenever certain human rights standards serve as 
requirements to enter a treaty-regime, it might become 
harder for the UK to prove the sufficiency of its human 
rights protection.
Responsibility under the Convention System to Preserve 
Justice and Peace in Europe
Finally, it should not be forgotten that by signing the 
Convention the UK adopted the responsibility for 
cooperating with other European states to preserve a 
peaceful Europe. As the preamble states, a common 
understanding and observance of human rights would 
furnish a complementary and thus a better foundation of 
justice and peace in Europe than the mere reliance on 
human rights’ implementation within political democracies. 
Such a common understanding can only be achieved by 
institutional cooperation, such as through the judicial 
cooperation or that between the Committee of Ministers 
and the political institutions of the Convention states in the 
implementation process. Additionally, by furnishing an 
external and collective system of checks and balances, the 
Convention system helps to effectively enforce the common 
observance of human rights in Europe. More precisely, as an 
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external monitor, the ECtHR serves to strengthen the 
domestic judiciary’s independence from improper political 
pressures when enforcing human rights against the majority. 
Although a domino-effect is not presumable – also in the 
Inter-American system Venezuela’s withdrawal did not have 
a bandwagon effect – it would be a bad sign if one of the 
founding countries quit the Convention.
Conclusion 
The Conservatives’ suggestions seem to form part of another 
sorry episode of envisaged short-term political gains 
thriving at the expense of the Convention system (which are 
mirrored with respect to the Conservatives’ proposals to 
hold an in-out referendum on British EU membership). Most 
probably, however, the Conservatives’ endeavor to repeal 
the HRA and to withdraw from the Convention as a measure 
of last resort will turn out to be a mere flash in the pan and 
no real threat to the Convention system. This is because 
these steps would entail considerable domestic as well as 
international repercussions. Moreover, the attempt to 
reinforce an unlimited parliamentary sovereignty and an 
unchallenged UK judiciary is largely anachronistic and 
unrealistic against the background of the UK’s changing 
concept of democracy and in times of an interdependent 
and interlinked system of human rights protection that does 
not stop at national borders. Considering the groups of 
people that were protected by the ECtHR’s girded case-law 
– prisoners and asylum seekers, who have no political lobby 
– the Convention system’s importance for minority 
protection in Europe, as an external check on short-sighted 
domestic politics, is once again underscored. Still, the 
unfortunate misuse of the ECtHR as an external scapegoat 
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for internal problems should be more actively addressed by a 
concerted communication strategy of the Convention states.
Jannika Jahn works as a research fellow at the Max-Planck-
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 
Heidelberg.
All articles of the symposium appear as well 
on Verfassungsblog.
ISSN 2510-2567
Tags: ECHR
Print Facebook Twitter Email   
Related
At a crossroads: Russia 
and the ECHR in the 
aftermath of Markin
Conceivable legal 
responses to 
environmental 
displacement
Respect and 
Protection of 
International Law 
Beyond the Borders (of 
Human Rights)
PREVIOUS POST
The Backlash against International Courts 
NEXT POST
Hört erst beim Geld die Freundschaft auf? 
Page 10 of 11The UK’s Potential Withdrawal from the ECHR | Völkerrechtsblog
25.01.2017http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-uks-potential-withdrawal-from-the-echr/
No Comment
Leave a reply 
Logged in as ajv2016. Log out?
SUBMIT COMMENT
 Notify me of follow-up comments by email.
 Notify me of new posts by email.
Copyright © 2016 · | ISSN 2510-2567 | Impressum & Legal   
Page 11 of 11The UK’s Potential Withdrawal from the ECHR | Völkerrechtsblog
25.01.2017http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-uks-potential-withdrawal-from-the-echr/
